



SAFETY ALERT 2021-02

Issue: 01

Date of Issue: 21st January 2021

SUBJECT:

RETURN TO SERVICE OF AIRCRAFT FROM STORAGE

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS:

- a) UAE CAR X
- b) EASA return to service of aircraft from storage Guidelines

REASON / PURPOSE:

This Safety Alert is issued to guide continuing airworthiness management organizations (CAMOs) and approved maintenance organizations (AMOs) in the return to service of aircraft that have not flown for a prolonged period due to the air travel restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic or any other reason.

Disclaimer: This Safety Alert should not be correlated with the grounding of B737 MAX. B737 MAX Return to Service requirements are specified separately.

BACKGROUND

The resumption of passenger flights post COVID-19 is restarting gradually. This requires the restoration of aircraft which have been stored for some time to an airworthy condition.

Most affected organizations were not planning for a rapid and mass storage of their aircraft, hence the effective and safe return to service would require the application of Safety Management principles and practices in the area of Safety Risk Management.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The information contained in this safety alert provide continuing airworthiness management organizations (CAMOs) and approved maintenance organizations (AMOs) with possible scenarios which may be considered for the proactive identification of hazards associated with aircraft storage and return to service in line with their Safety Management Systems and other associated procedures.

Furthermore, it is also recommended that continuing airworthiness management organizations (CAMOs) and approved maintenance organizations (AMOs) coordinate closely in implementing storage related procedures to ensure that they are appropriately applied

Recommendation 1:

Proactive Hazard Identification

At the starting point and during the Storage procedure, proactive identification of hazards by the CAMO and/or the AMO may include the following areas:



- a) Fuel condition
- b) Supply Chain
- c) Human resources availability and competency with special emphasis on Human Factors principles, due to the effects of COVID-19
- d) Information access and exchange
- e) Procedures adequacy and currency
- f) Aircraft Airworthiness documentation status (ARC, CoR, CoA etc.)

Recommendation 2:

Reactive Hazard Identification

During application of the Storage process, reactive identification by the CAMO and/or AMO can be considered by utilizing the analyzing data collected on defects, findings and conditions found by the AMO on aircraft while conducting storage related maintenance procedures and/or preparing it for return to service and which can be reasonably assumed to be linked with aircraft storage

The defects, observations and findings can be collected and linked, where applicable, to a fleet of aircraft being stored in the same or similar condition. This data should be collected as soon as possible after the manifestation of the defect or condition on a single aircraft and exchanged with the CAMO without delay.

The CAMO and/or AMO shall also communicate certain types of findings to the Type Certificate Holder and/or the GCAA, via the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System as required by pertinent regulations as referred in AMC-22

Recommendation 3:

Hazard Analysis Prior to Return to Service

The early analysis of the process to be followed to return to service a significant number of aircraft should lead to the identification of hazards and related risks for which mitigating strategies can be defined upfront. The risks entailed by such hazards can only be assessed by each organization. Following is a non-exhaustive list of Hazards which can be considered for appropriate Safety Risk Management.

a) Aircraft Storage:

- 1) Aircraft not (or not fully) stored in accordance with storage procedures and Instructions for continued Airworthiness "ICA".
- 2) Aircraft stored at airfields where only minimum maintenance services are available.
- 3) Robbery of spare parts from one aircraft for use on another aircraft.
- 4) Effects of the environment during aircraft storage



b) Personnel:

- 1) Absence of key personnel
- 2) Commercial or time pressure while conducting airworthiness review or other inspections
- 3) Commercial or time pressure affecting human performance.

c) Procedures:

- 1) Aircraft not preserved/protected fully in accordance with storage procedures
- 2) Inappropriate decision making in unknown situation (the organizations/teams may face situations not addressed in existing organization approved procedures) and subject to changes.
- 3) Staff with limited experience on storage procedures.
- 4) Covid-19 health recommendation poses restrictions on group activities.

d) Services from suppliers

- 1) Suppliers not delivering on time or the required quantity or with the expected quality.
- 2) AMO tools and equipment not serviceable (e.g. AMO tools calibrations expired or tools corroded due to lack of use without adequate protection)
- 3) Need to complement workforce with external personnel that are not used to our working methods.

CONTACT:

Contact your Airworthiness Principal Inspector