



SAFETY ALERT 2020-08

Issue 01

Date of Issue: October 12, 2020

SUBJECT:

PITOT-STATIC ISSUES AFTER STORAGE DUE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS:

- EASA SIB NO.: 2020-14 ISSUED: 05 AUGUST 2020;
- SAFETY DECISION 2020-17 ISSUE 2 PUBLISHED ON MAY 28, 2020

DATE OF APPLICABILITY

Immediately (date of issuance)

BACKGROUND:

REASON:

The purpose of this Safety Alert is to:

- Highlight the issue of potential pitot/static system contamination, on aircraft returned to service after storage, to maintenance organisations, operators and flight crews;
- Remind maintenance organisations and aircraft operators to comply with SD 2020-17; and
- Remind aircrews of actions required to identify and following the identification of an unreliable airspeed condition.

APPLICABILITY:

- Maintenance organisations;
- Aircraft Operators;
- Flight Crews.

DESCRIPTION:

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the aviation industry globally to a halt and an important number of aircraft has been grounded.

With the resumption of passenger flights around the world, "EASA has noticed an alarming trend in the number of reports of unreliable speed and altitude indications during the first flight(s) following the aircraft leaving storage, caused by contaminated air data systems".

In the UAE, we have registered two reports related to pitot Probe Cover found burnt and we believe that the risk of the accumulation of foreign objects in the pitot static system should be addressed and assessed by the UAE operators.



RECOMMENDATION 1: CAMOs AND AMOs

CAMOs and AMOs should:

- carefully follow the maintenance instructions for cleaning and inspecting the pitot static system during the return back to service of aircraft, including new and recently updated guidance/recommendations from the TC holders and/or design approval holders.
- assess, if the maintenance instructions are adequate to the situation, contacting the TC holders and/or design approval holders for further instructions, as necessary when it is suspected that there could be contamination of the air data system/pitot static probes.
- Review reported contaminated pitot tubes after aircraft storage and perform Safety Risk Assessments, associated with any identified risks, as required;
- follow SD 2020-17 related to operations resumptions planning

RECOMMENDATION 2: AIR OPERATORS

Air operators should:

- review their internal Safety Reporting system to identify if unreliable speed and altitude indications have been identified by flight crews and perform Safety Risk Assessments, associated with any identified risks, as required;
- Report to the GCAA, via ROSI system, any event related to contaminated pitot tubes after aircraft storage.
- Facilitate implementation of Recommendation No. 3 below.

RECOMMENDATION 3: FLIGHT CREWS

Flight Crews should:

- Conduct thorough pre-flight checks on pitot/static systems before flight especially if the aircraft has just, or recently, returned to service.
- Ensure, pre-flight, that thorough Threat and Error Management (TEM) briefings include the identification of an unreliable airspeed condition and the appropriate response. This should include but not be limited to:
 - o Cross-check of airspeed during take-off roll, as per SOP, and what actions to take if a discrepancy is identified;
 - o Rejected Take Off (RTO) procedure;



- Unreliable Airspeed/Altitude indications including memory items.
- Reinforce, where necessary, identified training objectives relating to unreliable airspeed/altitude indications.

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