SAFETY ALERT 2018-10
Issue 01
Date of Issue: 1st August 2018

SUBJECT: KUWAIT RESTRICTED, PROHIBITED AND DANGER AREAS

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS: KUWAIT AIP

REASON:
An aircraft (not UAE registered aircraft), during a parallel entry to the holding point at Kuwait International Airport (OKBK), had entered into a restricted area and collided with an operating tethered balloon radar. The collision inflicted major damage to the aircraft left engine cowling. The GCAA has supported the Kuwaiti investigation team and the investigation concluded that several findings were identified as probable causes to the incident, the following findings are considered the most relevant:

a) None of the flight crew was aware of the existence of the restricted area nor of the presence of tethered balloon radar activity.

b) The Operator’s route briefings manual and Jeppesen charts did not include sufficient information for the flight crews about restricted, danger, and prohibited areas and their published heights.

c) The Jeppesen approach chart showed the danger and prohibited areas and small part of the restricted area without the published height for each area.

d) There was no information published in the Operator’s briefing package for the flight crews about the tethered balloon activity.

This Safety Alert is issued to ensure that UAE Operators:

a) Take note of the relevant conclusions of the quoted occurrence at OKBK;

b) Establish mitigation means to prevent from re-occurrence of similar event at OKBK and any other destination.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
All UAE operators should:

a) Take note of the above mentioned findings on the quoted incident at OKBK when used as final destination or as alternate aerodrome;
b) Conduct a review on the route manual and coordinate with their service providers (e.g. Jeppesen and Lido) to ensure conformity with the current Kuwait aeronautical information publication (AIP) which depicts the restricted area (OK R08), danger area (OK D04), and prohibited area (OK P01), associated with the published height for each area.

c) Establish a means to ensure that all electronic charts in used remain in conformity with the published State of Aerodrome AIP unless the UAE Operator has built enough data to deviate from it. Such decision to deviate should be based on hazard register and carry out safety risk assessment exercise.

d) Report to the State of Aerodrome any inaccurate information that the UAE Operator has identified in the concerned AIP.

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